Elites in Soviet and post-Soviet societies

Irmina Matonytë

Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania and Director of Public Policy Research Center, Kaunas
Paper presented at the Fourth Nordic Conference on the Anthropology of Post-Socialism, April 2002

Table of contents

Nomenklatura system
Conversion, circulation and reproduction of the old elites
Nomenklatura's conversion: diversity of modes and trajectories
Post-communist elites: from the first towards the second generation

Notes

In societies controlled by the Soviet power the elites (nomenklatura) occupied a place much more central and vital than their analogues in the West with democratic system and market economy subject to competition cursus honorum and exposed to the redistributive results of alternations in power. The Communist Party controlled all socio-economic spheres and tried to perfectly assure its own ideological domination. But it concealed itself, imposed the obligation of secret. The Communist power in reality was not willing to be described neither in its mechanisms of functioning, nor in its privileged situation vis-à-vis the rest of society, because objective data were incompatible with and contradictory to the principles of its legitimacy which was based, on one hand, on the principle of equality and, on the other hand, on the workers' origin of those who were in power. Studies of elite under communism were rare, sometimes medium strata of nomenklatura were included into the empirical research (Wasilewski 1981 carried research about enterprise directors and executive functionaries), but samples consciously avoided political decision makers. Foreign sociologists or refugees to the West who have had access to the lists of nomenklatura have done some descriptive research (Djilas, Lowit, Ionescu, Harasymiw, Mink, Voslensky). This research explained institutional functioning of the system, but it could not provide much substantive sociological insights.

Nomenklatura system

Nomenklatura is an elaborate system of executive appointment established in early 1920s when the Bolsheviks urgently needed to recruit and place politically reliable individuals in decision-making positions in all sectors of society. Theoretical and organizational basis for the nomenklatura as an administrative system was developed in writings of the Marxists thinkers and comprehensively introduced by Stalin in the 30's. After World War II, the nomenklatura system was carried into the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, where Soviet control over occupation of many key positions plugged national networks into the central keyboard of Soviet power. It is important to underline that the legal (formalized by fixed laws and regulations) background for the centralized functioning of nomenklatura system, of its files and documents keeping, of its very existence has never been explicitly formulated. The nomenklatura system functioned on the basis of particular and concrete decisions adopted by the Party, of secret instructions and of practical experience of nomination. The method of cadres' selection and work with the cadres was founded on personal communication between the instructors responsible for nomenklatura and the candidates to nomenklatura, after the person has been approved to the position, he/she became a subject to permanent personalized control. Only Gorbachev's initiatives of glasnost' and pravavoe gosudarstvo discovered that nomenklatura system relied on these pervading totalitarian subjective "ethnographic" (as opposed to rationally-legally spelled out) practices.

Nomenklatura was a list, nominative and confidential, of framework positions, from the top to bottom, of the social and political life, as the highest Party authorities established them. In order to be in nomenklatura, it was not necessary to be a communist, but in general it was always the case⁽¹⁾.

In essence, nomenklatura consisted of two sets of lists: one of all the important posts in party and State bureaucracy as well as leading social organizations, and a second of all those regarded by the authorities as suitable qualified to fill them⁽²⁾ (indeed, these later consisted of two types of lists: one of actual members of the decision-making structures and another of potential members suitable to replace or to join the functioning power structure). Nomenklatura occupied the nerve- center administrative positions in the State apparatus for which only members and activists of the Communist Party could be appointed after being selected and accredited.

Kenneth C. Farmer provides the CPSU Central Committee Nomenklatura list consisting of 13 entries: 1) Politburo and Secretariat members, 2) responsible members of the Central Committee apparatus, 3) editors of central Party and government press organs, 4) ministers, deputy ministers, chiefs and deputy chiefs of main administrations, directors and deputy directors of collegia, heads and deputy heads of state committees and administrations, 5) ambassadors and responsible workers in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 6) secretaries of krai, oblast, raion and union republic party committees, secretaries and department heads of union republic central committees, chairmen and presidium members of the Council of Ministers of union republics, 7) members of the USSR Supreme Court, USSR Procurator General and deputies, union republic and oblast procurators, chairman and deputy chairmen of USSR, union republic, and oblast state security committees (KGB), 8) responsible personnel of the Presidium of the USSR, 9) military personnel down to the rank of division commander, 10) heads and deputy heads of All Union Central Council of trade unions, All Union Komsomol, and social organizations, 11) chairmen and secretaries of professional unions, 12) directors of central scientific institutes, directors and teachers of central and republican Party schools, 13) directors of major industrial enterprises and trusts⁽³⁾.

It is estimated that in the USSR number of nomenklatura posts could be as high as 750.000 that is approximately a third of the two and a half million positions of any administrative importance in the Soviet system⁽⁴⁾. In Poland at the end of the 1970s nomenklatura amounted to 13 000⁽⁵⁾. These estimations concern nomenklatura par excellence. Sociologists underlying social basis and implications of this phenomenon, use numbers ten times bigger.

Recent historical research documents that « pure » nomenklatura of the Baltic States varied very much over time: in 1953 in Lithuania it had 4584 members, in Estonia- 2252 and in Latvia- 2038; in 1974 respectively- 1873, 1753 and 4025, in late 1990' it counted around 1 400 in Lithuania, 1209 (in 1989) in Latvia and around 800 in Estonia⁽⁶⁾. These figures indicate that nomenklatura in the Baltic's was shaped not exactly to be proportional to the population of the Republic, but also was influenced by political considerations and subjective factors. Only in late 70's changes in the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian nomenklatura have been synchronized and proportions of different nomenklatura groups harmonized. Study of nomenklatura in the Baltic States is even more complicated because of the fact that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania belonged to the USSR: it means their nomenklatura was a part of the integrated nomenklatura of the USSR. Depending on time and concrete Baltic Republic there were 27- 81 top level positions (Republican Party and government authorities) which were in the highest nomenklatura established by the Central Committee in Moscow, in parallel some 12- 75 leaders of ministerial level belonged to the nomenklatura controlled by the Central Committee in Moscow⁽⁷⁾. Moreover, in case of the Baltic States it is meaningful to distinguish the "civil" and the military nomenklaturas. Military leadership formed a separate and influential social group, which all over the Soviet era has been organized, controlled and managed exclusively by the central organs of the CP. The Central Committees in the Baltic Republics were only responsible for mobilization (recruitment of 18 old men to military service), civil defense and enterprises with minor tasks in military industry. A telling sign of weakness of the "civil" authorities in Republics vis-à-vis military leadership in Baltic's is in the fact that their Party authorities have had no say on military promotion (military degrees accreditation) or decorations for the distinguished military staff. Three Baltic Republics were grouped into one Baltic (Pribaltijskij) military district with its center in Riga, and its authorities practically ignored opinion and viewed from high all the initiatives of the local "civil" authorities. In Latvia nomenklatura suffered the most: being located in the same city, it was always under critical top- military supervision which not only disregarded it but also fought with it an unacknowledged but intensive battle for social influence and prestige⁽⁸⁾. The "civil" Latvian nomenklatura was the most vulnerable target of its military counterpart: as one ex-member of the Lithuanian nomenklatura with a grain of compassion told about his partners in Latvia: "One thing was to be denounced or criticized by the "equals" from inferior civil nomenklatura, another- by the "equals" from superior military people"…

All these facts illustrate that in all territorial districts of the USSR (USSR, republic, region) the Central Committee of the Communist Party controlled the most important nominations. The list of the most important positions has been prepared on the highest level, power of nomination to lower levels could been delegated. However, the last resort of power always was in Moscow. This phenomenon is illustrated by the fact that the Soviet Republics did not have Secretary General- here the highest party official have had title of the First Secretary⁽⁹⁾.

One more particularity, which reveals specificity of the USSR nomenklatura system, is related to the figure of the Second Secretary (who responsible for the staff, i.e. for nomenklatura itself, he prepared propositions for the choice of cadres, controlled activities of all social and professional organizations, was responsible for education and performance of cadres, controlled composition of the Party). In the Baltic States this person has always been a Russian sent from Moscow. Practically, it has always been a case (except for one year in Lithuania, when Motiejus Šumauskas, backed by Berija, performed these duties during interior struggles in Kremlin after Stalin's death)⁽¹⁰⁾. Algirdas Brazauskas, the last First Secretary of the Communist Party in Lithuania (in 1992 turned to be the first President of independent Lithuania) tells: «It is important to underline the specificity of the 2^nd Secretary. His status was exceptional. It was a man sent by Moscow. His role was to supervise our way to execute the tasks, our manner to comply to the orders of the USSR, at what level appear deviances and why. He controlled us, he entertained relations with Moscow and with the KGB. All the propositions concerning somebody's nomination to any post in so called nomenklatura or in the sphere controlled by the Central Committee, could not avoid attention of the 2^nd Secretary. On the other hand, there always was a man very close to us in order to control all national and local events and to make reports to his superiors »⁽¹¹⁾.

As it was stated above, all the highest political positions have been controlled by Moscow, but power to nominate lower level elite has been delegated to the authorities in Soviet republics. An important (and maybe the main) characteristic of the Baltic nomenklatura's stance vis-à-vis central USSR institutions is revealed in their national composition. After Stalin's death number of nationals started to constantly increase. The most visible changes occurred in Lithuania: in 1953 there were 53.3 percent of Lithuanians in the middle range nomenklatura, in 1968 their proportion increased to 79.1 percent and in 1986 it achieved 91.9 percent. Similar trend (however, of smaller scope) is observed in Latvia and Estonia (the highest portion of Latvians has been reached in 1974- it amounted to 74.6 percent). An significant feature of nomenklatura in Latvia and Estonia was a big number of russified Estonians and Latvians in the highest party leadership: all over the Soviet period in Politburo of Estonia and Latvia they counted for a quarter or even one third of the members⁽¹²⁾. By all means, it was tried to avoid "national bases" within the State. One technique, especially widely used in Estonia and Latvia, was to integrate local leaders into the Soviet system⁽¹³⁾. During the Soviet period, attaining a Moscow education and marrying a Russian was the ideal means of gaining support from the high rank nomenklatura and making a fast career after returning home. Lithuanians from the Central Committee in charge of nomination could much more noticeably favour Lithuanians- in Lithuania, in late 80's almost all the directors of industrial enterprises were Lithuanians (in some « sensible » enterprises positions of vice-directors have been offered to Russians).

The lists of the cultural elite, contrary to the practice in the Eastern Europe, have been very long and scrupulous in the USSR. Theaters, culture, mass media were controlled very tightly. The lists of the cultural elite in 70- 80's in the Baltic Republics were even longer and more explicit than in the Center of the USSR. It was a price to pay in exchange of possibility to teach social and human sciences and to develop art in the periphery of the USSR (Tartu, Vilnius, Tbilisi): "It would be naïve to assume that the Institute [of Philosophy and Sociology in Lithuania- I.M.] broke away from any ideological control and was free to chose its way of expression and activity and that the watchful old guard just let the matters go. There were complaints, there were checks and controls, disapprovals and resolutions from the high institutions (CC of the CPL) on the unsatisfactory ideological orientation, on serious mistakes in staff hiring"⁽¹⁴⁾. Even though there was no obvious need to control through nomenklatura system activities of various hobby circles and cultural interest groups, the very principle of any organization independent from the State has been unacceptable for the existing Soviet system. In such associations presence of people from nomenklatura was not much hidden. The only non-State and non- nomenklatura organizations were religious institutions, but they were under continuous pressure to be turned into the nomenklatura's subject. Recent history of the Catholic Church in Lithuania contains a lot of stories of such interventions. Although in the Lithuanian dissident literature published in the Soviet time and in the burgeoning post-communist public discourse, the KGB (which was structurally independent from the nomenklatura established in the Baltic Republics) is named as the worst enemy of religious life, in reality the KGB worked in close cooperation with nomenklatura and itself was partly dependent on it. Thus, it is meaningful to say that in final account nomenklatura was in the background of all repressive and controlling activities.

In all societies controlled by the Soviet power, despite some minor local specificity, the nomenklatura system functioned in similar way and reproduced itself. Organizational stability of nomenklatura positions and permanence of concrete in nomenklatura system has been noticed by many researchers. The Soviet regime opponents have criticized closed nomenklatura but little social mobility at the very top of power structures has been viewed as a positive thing by the Soviet regime itself ("instability of cadres" was one of the worst accusations for the authorities responsible for nomenklatura). Means by which initially intensive change in nomenklatura has been slowed down, led to formation of well-defined nomenklatura layer with such inner solidarity that even rotation (fluctuations from one into another decision-making position) became quite rare. Once in nomenklatura, an individual was virtually guaranteed a succession of tenured posts for life. Advancement up various nomenklatura career ladders in the beginning of the Soviet regime in the Baltics and Eastern Europe depended on political loyalty, but later on it become more and more contingent to mixture of personal ability (merit) and patronage (networks). In 1970-1974 more than a half of the members of the CC of the LCP have already occupied their positions for more than 10 years (similar trends were in Latvia and Estonia, however, of lesser extent). In late 70's- early 80's around one third (30.7 percent in Estonia, 32.1 percent in Lithuania and 30.5 percent in Latvia) of middle range nomenklatura positions were for more than 10 years filled with physically the same individuals⁽¹⁵⁾. Gradual decrease of social nomenklatura's mobility indicates not only that a stable layer of decision makers has been established, but also that it turned into a social group fully sufficient to the needs of the Soviet State. By the 1970's it is reasonable to claim that nomenklatura represented an operational definition of the Soviet ruling stratum. This word could also mean the dominant class (or, to use another concept, the elites in a sociological meaning of the term).

As it is described above, nomenklatura system locked up not only all the State apparatuses, but it also directly influenced social organizations which only at the first glance were independent. Hence, nomenklatura principle completely shaped the profile of elite under communism. Alienated from the population, with their own customs, life styles and quality, their converging strategies of behavior, communist elites expressed tendency to defend their privileged social position and to assure privileged positions for their descendants. Even though intergenerational reproduction of nomenklatura has encountered some difficulty, since nomenklatura children sometimes rebelled against their parents' political function, in the Baltic Republics these facts are to be qualified as individual incidents which never amounted to the level of socially important phenomenon as some authors describe the Polish or Hungarian specificities of their nomenklatura where "many cadre children did not want to become cadre members themselves: some became dissidents; many opted for professional careers; and most did so with the approval of their parents. The nomenklatura (…) was continuously recruited from the lower ranks of society"⁽¹⁶⁾. However, the Baltic republics were not such safe and secure nomenklatura territories as "the rest of the USSR [where= I.M.] nomenklatura was successfully passing their bureaucratic privileges on to their children. (…) in Soviet Russia the bureaucratic ruling estate separated itself from the rest of society by caste-like barriers"⁽¹⁷⁾. Notwithstanding the fact that in the Baltics (to lesser extent) and in Central Europe (to greater extent) there were limits to formation of such closed self-perpetuating nomenklatura caste, semi-caste type of privileges has been established there. Since the only legal income in the USSR was salary paid by the State, positions in the political power also meant economic domination in the society. The biggest privilege of nomenklatura member - salary for his/her job, was frequently boosted by primes and various supplementary payments. Privilege for nomenklatura consisted in simplified access to apartments and collective gardens as well as in easy access to various goods and services, which under Soviet power were in constant shortage. By the way, nomenklatura's structural propensity and ability to consume much and good things has opened specific channels of corruption. Blurred boundaries of responsibility and absence of private/ public distinction (epitomized by the fact that some leisure activities for nomenklatura members have been financed from the State budget - for instance, hunting) turned nomenklatura into a very specific social group opposed to the rest of society. The notion of nomenklatura imposed itself as signifying a real dominant group with individuals of equal social status, similar values and converging behavior. This definition, born in the everyday discourse, recuperates the administrative auto-definition, created by the Party. In the communist regime, nomenklatura covered essential political, economic and cultural elites and by this virtue constituted a group "in itself" and "for itself".

On one hand, after collapse of the Communist rule, contacts, specialist knowledge and uncertainty about valuation of State property all made it easier for nomenklatura stalwarts to perpetuate their power on a new basis. On the other hand (as some observers and researchers persuasively argue), the process of nomenklatura accommodation (or "trajectory adjustment" as it is called by Szelényi) has weakened conservative resistance to the prospect of reform and ultimately increased the chances of overall change⁽¹⁸⁾.

Conversion, circulation and reproduction of the old elites

If time perspective in the post-communist societies we examine two competing "reproduction versus circulation" hypothesis quoted above ("reproduction" and "circulation" of elites), we observe increasingly smooth reproduction of the old elites. In the political sphere, the process is reversed: direct reproduction of the old elites becomes less and less probable with time going on. However, successful reproduction (conversion) at the political top (from the ruling Communist Party into social democracy friendly to market economy) that at the beginning appeared difficult and improbable (or even impossible) because of formalized "lustration" laws and sensitive public opinion (limitations have been put on the ex-communists to aspire to socially important positions), but finally - through reversed electoral tendency ("pendulum" effect) such a conversion turned to be quite impressive.

The hypothesis of agreement between elites (what Hungarian sociologist Elemer Hankiss called the "Big Coalition") or of premeditation (juridical manipulation to favor nomenklatura according to Polish sociologist Staniszkis), which could facilitate the birth of "savage" (the Russian version), "spontaneous" (the Hungarian version) or "political" (the Polish version) capitalism, formulated in the revolutionary context after 1989 has been very fashionable and widely instrumentalized by political opponents of the ex-communists. The Baltic cases represent some mixture of these politically termed capitalisms, the Lithuanian version approaching the "political" Polish case, the Estonian- the "spontaneous" Hungarian and the Latvian- the "savage" Russian case of capitalism with the corresponding accents, put in the political and social discourses of the respective countries.

However, the premeditation thesis (otherwise it could be called nomenklatura's conspiracy) does not resist the test of facts. For instance, in Czechoslovakia where surprise of the breakdown of communism has been quasi- integral, there was no possibility to freely chose comfortable "exit" from the communist "apparatchik" career and to consciously embark in economic enterprise: here, consecutive to the Velvet Revolution, at stake was the very survival of the former "apparatchiks" in the repressive environment ("lustration" laws). Old political cadres found themselves among the victims of change. Nevertheless, thanks to their capabilities to adapt to neo-capitalism they were capable to maintain their high social status more successfully than workers or peasants in difficulty. According to mobility calculations produced by Petr Mateju, the most mobile individuals were those who in 1989 combined the status of superior cadre with membership in the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Historical specificity of this country made that this combination (superior cadre/ Communist party member) for the former "apparatchiks" opened practically equal possibility of both, rapid social regression (political sanction) and impressive social progression into entrepreneurial class. Mateju estimates that 57% of qualified professionals not Party members after 1989 have not moved neither upwards nor downwards from their socio-professional position. At the same time, 43% of "apparatchiks" preserved their high position if they accumulated both qualities (of a qualified professional and of a Party member)⁽¹⁹⁾.

The debate turning around the blunt thesis about political appropriation of capital moved forward thanks to empirical research conducted by Szelényi, Treiman and Wnuk-Lipinski⁽²⁰⁾ as well as by Mateju and Hanley⁽²¹⁾: questionnaires about social mobility conducted by the East European sociologists in 1992-1993 in four countries of Central and Eastern Europe (in Poland, Hungary and Russia by one Hungarian- Polish- American team and in the Czech Republic by its own Czech team) permitted to grasp the weight and the place of the old elites after 1989. They indicate different capacities and degree of reproduction of nomenklatura in different countries.

In four countries where research has been carried out many tendencies have been observed. First of all, idea that the whole nomenklatura gained from the regime change has been seriously challenged. Surely, there was some "revolutionary effect" and not negligible part of the old elite has been stopped in their social ascendancy. In Poland and Hungary about 20% of nomenklatura was forced to take anticipated retreat or found themselves disqualified, discarded of former advantages. In Russia this downward mobility was less harsh, it concerned only one tenth of the old elite. Certainly, broad rejuvenation of nomenklatura that took place under Gorbachev provides some explanation. Since coming to power in March 1985 Gorbachev has initiated replacement of nomenklatura according to merit rather than loyalty and readiness to obey Party directives. By late 1988 most of the Politburo, Secretariat, Central Committee, departmental heads, senior ministerial officials, 2 out of 3 First Secretaries in the republics and 3 out of every 5 at regional level have been changed⁽²²⁾. In the Baltic States nomenklatura downward mobility was due to de-Russification process spurred by pro- Independence movements and post-communist political reforms⁽²³⁾. Nomenklatura in Lithuania experienced the least dramatic changes, since it for majority consisted of "politically correct" Lithuanians. However, there is no systematic quantitative research on nomenklatura destinies in the post-communist Baltic States (what reminds us one more time of the "grey" research zone phenomenon described in the chapter above).

Another clearly expressed tendency is the flow of nomenklatura towards the private enterprises. In Hungary and Poland respectively 28% and 25% of the ex-nomenklatura became entrepreneurs. In Czech republic the proportion is around 20% and in Russia- 16%. 18.4 percent of former Polish, Czech and Hungarian nomenklatura (in power position in 1988) owned some business in 1993. This proportion translates into about 500 former nomenklatura members in Hungary and the Czech Republic, and about 800- 1000 in Poland (a much bigger country)⁽²⁴⁾. However, only about 7 or 8 percent of the former nomenklatura reported ownership in firms with more than ten employees, and only 3 or 4 percent of these owners reported more than 10 percent share in these business. Among these senior cadre families with 10 percent or more ownership stakes in actual private business, about half are families with a member from the political fraction of the former nomenklatura⁽²⁵⁾.

Table 1. Distribution of the communist elites (situation in 1988) according to their employment in 1993
Representative survey of the Hungarian, Polish and Russian nomenklaturas

Source: Elity w Polsce, na Wegrzech i w Rosji, Wymiana czy reprodukcja, (Elites in Poland, Hungary and Russia, Reproduction or change), Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, 1995, p. 127

Available research data from Estonia also show that members of former nomenklatura impressively entered private business, were barred (in this case totally!) from political activities, left management of public enterprises and collective farms and experienced - in proportion bigger than elsewhere in Eastern Europe- "pure" downward mobility (retreat).

Table No 2. Distribution of Estonian communist elites
(members of Central Committee of the ECP, 1991) according to their employment in 2001. N= 92, percent.

Source: Ruus Jüri, Taru Marti. "The Changing Composition of Estonian Elites: From de-sovietification to professionalism and European Integration", Paper presented in the Workshop "Elites in the Baltics", Kaunas University of Technology, October 20, 2001, p.4

The numbers indicating elite reproduction are even more eloquent when we analyze the economic nomenklatura only. In Hungary almost one half of the economic nomenklatura entered the private enterprise (43%), in Poland 30,8%, in Russia 16,7%. In the Polish economic sector phenomena of elite reproduction are the most obvious: in the private as well as in the public sector proportion of nomenklatura is close to 50%, the rate of ex-communists is superior to 40%⁽²⁶⁾. Somewhat differently constructed sample of the Lithuanian elite (Matonytë 2001) shows that the rate of ex-communists in 1996 in the leadership of post-communist economy was as high as 36% and proportion of nomenklatura (people who already in 1988 were in high managerial positions but not necessarily were members of the CP) is around 40%.

In this respect Russia presents a particular case: here changes are less visible and reproduction of nomenklatura, especially in the economic apparatus, is more pronounced. Collapse of the Soviet regime did not signified elimination of directors of enterprises: in 1993 they are the same as they were in 1991. Indeed, more than 57% of the old nomenklatura from 1988 succeeded to maintain positions in the Russian elite in 1993⁽²⁷⁾.

In the Baltics the thesis of nomenklatura reproduction is also supported by data collected and analyzed by Norwegian political scientist Anton Steen. He examined the background of the post- soviet Baltic elite (in the parliament, bureaucracy, state and private enterprises, political parties, municipalities and academia) and found a high degree of elite continuity.

Table No. 3 Previous Occupation and Membership in the Communist Party (in 1988) of the Baltic Elites (in 1993-1994) (Percent)

Source: Anton Steen. The New Elites in the Baltic States: Recirculation and Change/ Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1997. p. 102.

About half of the current elite in the Baltic countries is recruited among people who might be considered as former members of widely defined nomenklatura. In Estonia and Latvia "pure" elite continuity clearly dominated over change: respectively, 53 and 55 percent of present leaders have communist and senior cadre past. In Lithuania their share amounts to 44 percent. On the contrary, "pure" upward mobility (from non- party and no high former occupation) is very small: 1 percent in Estonia, 4 percent in Lithuania and 8 percent in Latvia. (By the way, Latvian figure is quite impressive but neither Steen, nor us dare to present any solid explanation for it). The combination of earlier low position and Party membership is also higher in Latvia (15 percent) than in Lithuania (3 percent) or Estonia (1 percent). (The question why and how did it happen that CP membership has been of some use to the former low status group in Latvia remains also unexplored).

The Lithuanian case presents the most "revolutionary" example: there 49 percent of people who were not CP members but occupied leadership positions in 1988 happened to enter elite in 1993 (in comparison to 44 percent of those who combined the CP membership and leadership positions). This juxtaposition permits to generalize that in Lithuania former membership in CP sometimes could also be detrimental for the post-communist upward mobility. Or as Steen formulates it: "Persons in Lithuania with earlier high positions but not tainted by a communist background have had especially good opportunities to enter elite positions after the regime change. (…). In Estonia, and in particular in Latvia, the 'ideological innocence' seems to have been less relevant." ⁽²⁸⁾

Two specifically Baltic variables enter the game - the de-Russification process (manifestly expressed in Estonia and Latvia) and impact of local semi-alternative elites (more noticeable in Lithuania).

Comparing above exposed portion of Russian in former Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian nomenklatura (which, respectively, for around one half, one third and one tenth were composed of Russians) and the post- communist composition of the Baltic elites, we observe a tremendous change in their ethnic representation.

Table No. 4. Ethnic Composition of Baltic Elites in 1993 (Percent)

Source: Anton Steen. The New Elites in the Baltic States: Recirculation and Change// Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1997. p. 104.

These data unequivocally indicate that Russians have been spectacularly removed from elite positions in the Baltic States. Only 4 percent of elites in Lithuania are non-Lithuanians and Russians among them take a modicum 1 percent while Russians count for more than 8 percent in the population. It is interesting to remark that Poles who are less represented in the population (7 percent) occupy 3 percent of total elite positions in Lithuania⁽²⁹⁾. Russians compose 3 percent of parliamentary and 3 percent of private business groups in Lithuania, and Poles respectively count for 5 percent and 7 percent, some more 3 percent of Poles belong to the intellectual elite of the post-soviet Lithuania. Change in ethnic composition of post-soviet Latvian and Estonian elites is much more spectacular. In 1993, in Estonia no Russians were found among parliament members but 15 percent of State business, and 6 percent of private business were run by Russians there. In Estonia Russians represented 14 percent of political parties and movements leadership, 12 percent of intellectual elite and 19 percent of decision makers in the municipalities⁽³⁰⁾. In Latvia the picture is quite similar- although there are 17 percent of Russians in the Parliament, they are better represented among economic elite (43 percent), some Russians are among top bureaucrats (2 percent), leaders of political parties and movements (4 percent) as well as among intellectuals (7 percent)⁽³¹⁾.

One straightforward conclusion is that former advantage of being a Russian in the Baltics now turns to be disadvantage from the point of view of possibilities for the upward mobility or leadership. Another much more nuanced conclusion is that Russians in the Baltics siphon from political to economic domination. This trend could be interpreted as beneficial to the politically and economically transforming countries. When the most active Russian people become more and more involved in business, the scope for political mobilization among ordinary Russians is reduced, which in the short run may stabilize the political process⁽³²⁾. On the other hand, since Baltic economies are still heavily dependent on Russian materials and markets, a businessman Russian from the "near abroad" stands for a more attractive and pertinent business partner in Russia than a fellow Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian. Thus, changes in the position of Russians in the Baltic elites in a way contribute to both, political consolidation and development of free market in these countries.

Another issue to be discussed while studying post-soviet Baltic elites is the phenomenon of presence, role and place in leadership of the semi- alternative elite. Steen, for instance, holds that while in Latvia and Estonia "the main concern was the ethnicity of the new ruling elite, the reason why 'pure' alternative elite [leaders and high level functionaries, non Party members in 1988- I. M.] is larger in Lithuania may be related to the more nationally oriented communist party which allowed more liberal recruitment of elites during the pre-democratic period and to the more polarized transition to independence that purged earlier communists from the elite positions during the first stage of independence"⁽³³⁾. In other words, although not documented in any research, in pre-democratic period in Lithuania were going processes similar to Hungarian cooptation of experts and professionals not enrolled into the Communist party. However, the interpretation of such permissiveness in elite recruitment in communist Lithuania is explained somewhat differently than in communist Hungary. As Steen puts it: "A more national, independent communism in the pre-independent period in Lithuania opened for a more generous recruitment of non-CP members to elite positions"⁽³⁴⁾ while in Hungary cooptation has been one of political means to accommodate dissatisfied society and to pacify dissidents.

In the Baltic States social pressure and open dissent were far less possible and far less developed in the Soviet period for structural and cultural reasons. However, one of the leading Lithuanian political scientists A. Krupavièius without much hesitation talks about the "alternative" elite in the Baltics. According him, "two models and sources of alternative elites' development can be identified during the pre-transitional period. First, the long-term growth of the anti-systemic oppositional movements through independent trade unions (as Solidarity in Poland), the large scale legitimization crises of regime (as 1956 in Hungary, etc.), the long- term activities of dissident groups and the Church (Charter'77 in Czechoslovakia, the Catholic Church in Lithuania, network of Helsinki groups from late 1970s across the Baltics). Second, the explosion of the new elites on the eve of the transformation through new social movements, especially, environmental and green groups (in the Baltics in 1987- 1988), radicalization of the former pro-establishment organizations as creative unions (writers', composers', etc.) and semi-legal discussion groups and associations (…), and the shift of the official mass media to pro-democratic positions"⁽³⁵⁾. Yet presence of "pure" representatives of this two-fold alternative elite is of minimal scope in the elites of independent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Otherwise, we can say that there was next to no alternative national elite outside the party apparatus.

Alleged "alternative" elite has been formed of indigenous university educated people looking for new career opportunities and expressing patriotic orientations. There more pertinent (though much less provocative in political terms) is the age variable (evidently, sometimes it was reinforced by or itself reinforced the above quoted second source of "alternative" elite). The young generation was an important force behind the changes in all communist countries, but especially so in the Baltics. They were well educated, well informed urbanities with fewer psychological and social inhibitions than their parents' generation (Higley, Pakulski 1992 "Elite transformation in Eastern Europe and Russia" paper, XVI World Congress of IPSA, Berlin). If we consider that in the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party, the average age was 67 in 1981, gradually decreasing to 61 in 1986, and to 56 in 1991⁽³⁶⁾ and then examine the age structure of the new Baltic elites, we could be even amazed by their rejuvenation. The average age of the bureaucratic elite in Estonia is 43 years, and 46 in Latvia and Estonia. The percentage of top bureaucrats between 22- 44 years of age is 52 in Estonia, 50 in Lithuania, and 37 in Latvia⁽³⁷⁾. The average age of the first democratically elected Baltic parliaments was 50.8 in Lithuania, 45.3 in Latvia and 43.3 in Estonia⁽³⁸⁾. With the time passing, the Baltic parliament rejuvenates themselves even more. However, the most attractive and friendly field of socially important activity in the Baltics for people with nomenklatura background is in the economic realm. This observation brings us back to the issue of nomenklatura in the post-communist countries.

Whatever is numerical expression provided, mobility surveys in the post-communist Eastern Europe and Baltics brought a new theme well captured by Ivan Szelényi: if nomenklatura reproduces itself in such a visible fashion, it can not be only because of their political position, other "capitals" possessed by the members of nomenklatura should have played important role in such a conversion. Above all, Szelényi underlines, using Pierre Bourdieu studies, nomenklatura enjoyed historically rooted social and cultural capital, which could be compatible with the political capital (expressed by the Communist party membership), the main attribute of the Soviet elite.

Nomenklatura's conversion: diversity of modes and trajectories

Questions about the role of nomenklatura in the post-communist society may be generalized by two strong options. The first explains genesis of the post-communist capitalism by the anticipating calculation (Staniszkis) or by political pragmatism (Hankiss). The second via mobility surveys leads towards confirmation of real but not preponderant weight of this group in the new elites and especially in the economic elite (Szelényi, Mateju, Steen, Matonytë). Both thesis agree that there exists some correlation between the "rent of situation" of nomenklatura (variable "political capital") and its capacity of adaptation / conversion/ trajectory adjustment (variable "cultural capital").

It rests to answer a fundamental question: how in the mould of the Communist ideology (where collective ownership was the dogma) educated and socialized group could jump into liberal mode of capitalist action and thinking? Could it be mere pragmatism, rational calculation, free of any ideological and moral hesitation, fluster or grief?

Only qualitative survey (non standardized interviews with ex-nomenklatura) could from within shed some light on mutation of the Communist party into socio-democracy, of the former communist leaders paths into new capitalism⁽³⁹⁾. Such a study enables reconstruction of the chain through which transited the post-communist model of capitalism. It helps to understand diversity of motivations and trajectories experienced by important individual and collective actors. We can present our findings in the form of "three circles of nomenklatura conversion" succeeding each other from the center towards periphery.

Nomenklatura in Eastern Europe and Baltics was an actor of a strange conversion that preceded 1989 and which took place in three periods (three circles).

1. Changes at the core of the Communist system. In Poland and Hungary, countries the most open to complex economic exchanges (due to the Soviet power tolerated private sector and "shadow economy") and nurtured by substantive economic migrations and presence of the foreign capital, a radical transformation emerged in the very hearth of the system: changes have been introduced into the property regime and into the forms of capital. The Party-State started institutional changes the most evident symptoms of which were:

• irruption of the criterion of competence in the recruitment of elites at detriment of the political criterion. This modification concerned not only public enterprises (starting from 1988 in Poland and Hungary the workers could chose the managers), but also nomenklatura as such: it liberated itself from its own narrow political criteria of recruitment (this trend is documented all over the Soviet bloc);
   
• more real conformity to the market economy. In order to increase its cash, usual advance withholdings from the State budget were insufficient anymore; also this practice became more and more reprehensible. The Party encouraged its own organizations to transform the Party property into property administered by the limited liability companies. Thus, for instance, in Poland in 1988 the Party reactivated the law of 1934 on limited liability companies and legally transformed its patrimony: local and regional committees, the Central Committee could create private companies and engage into economic profit-making activities on the Party account. However, it would be abusive to affirm that the Party consciously introduced democratic competition for power positions. Indeed, it put all mechanisms of adaptation to the market economy with some double conviction: to stay in the decision- making body and to accept some compromises.

2. Nomenklatura initiated itself into the market economy by the laws of "auto-appropriation". In 1988 and in 1989 in Hungary and Poland, the Party made to vote laws, which allowed managers of enterprises (economic nomenklatura) to enter into possession of stocks of their enterprises. Later, these laws were betrayed as an instrumental for nomenklatura to enter into legal ownership of the public property. Reality was more complex: these laws, in the sense given to them by the legislators in place, were supposed - through introduction of competitive sectors - to make economy more dynamic. Since these laws authorized accumulation of leadership positions (it was possible to administer one public enterprise and at the same time to be a manager of the private enterprise, the former ordering goods or services from the later), some accumulation of capital has been brought about (in 1990 accumulation of leadership positions has been legally forbidden). Because of lack of proofs, absence of adequate legal instruments and realistic charges, only a few nomenklatura members were later condemned (In Poland) for such abuse of power.

3. Majority of nomenklatura proved to be a social layer capable of successful conversion: they were directors in communism and they became entrepreneurs in capitalism. Retrospectively one may resolutely say that even without any encouraging and permissive laws and free market friendly and affirmative Party actions, in the pool of nomenklatura (historically formed specific social group, layer or class) appeared some of the best post-communist entrepreneurs. Were they the most authentic entrepreneurs, formed under communism patiently waiting for their time to come? Is it only an idyllic image born and cherished in post-communist creative and desperate public opinion?

By no means, membership in the Communist party was the "driver license" for social success for a multitude of engineers with the worker origin and with the University diploma (massively produced in communism). Namely this social group formed the frame of nomenklatura of late Soviet regime. According to mobility survey carried by Szelényi and Treiman team, their cultural and social capital played much more important role in successful capitalist conversion than physical, financial capital acquired by the laws authorizing "auto-appropriation". For these cultural and social capitals they were (majority of them was) predisposed to become future capitalists.

In the process of systemic change, nomenklatura occupied a place all the more central because it succeeded in an especially prompt conversion - swiftness/ velocity of capital transformation is a rare characteristic of convertibility of one high value form of capital into another. To transfer from one type of action into another, to dominate mobility of schemes, to acquire savoir-faire and to use it in different circumstances - all these are classical features of efficient capital conversion in social systems.

Table No 5. Modes of reconversion of the ex-nomenklatura (1988-1992)

Revolution of 1989 certainly perturbed multiple aspects of the social capital held by the old communist elites, but they nevertheless appeared to be able to successfully mobilize it, bringing on surface the fact that the Communist Party indeed was multifaceted: yesterday this party was fighting against capitalism, a political-social system for which its members are more than in favor today. It appears that in recent past nomenklatura was only seemingly ill disposed towards free market, multiparty political system, democratic values and in this turning moment ex-nomenklatura was only seemingly ill-prepared.

"When the Party felt apart and when the fact that you have worked in the Central Committee - prestigious workplace up till then - became an obvious spot in your biography (it was my case), I was invited and elected to be the President of the Union of milk producers, association of some 15000 individuals".⁽⁴⁰⁾ But nomenklatura was not a simple weberian bureaucracy. In order to belong it, one had to manifest loyalty: thanks to his place in nomenklatura and his willingness to be there above quoted Šleževiius could several times visit the USA, study agricultural policies there and become an outstanding specialist of agriculture in Lithuania; in short, position in the decision making structures under communism allowed him to become "a good professional". Surely, nomenklatura provided good training in management of their country for future reformers and defense of "well done job", consecrated by capitalism, constitutes a persuasive defense for former reformers' adherence to the nomenklatura.

By the same token, as in 1992 so in 2000 a big portion of the electoral success story of the former communists (united under a social democratic program) is explained by professionalism, ability to learn quickly and efficiently, communication skills, etc. For instance, Gediminas Kirkilas, former vice-president of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (in power 1992- 1996) and parliament member from the Lithuanian Social democratic Party in power since 2001, tells: "When [people from the Socialist International] came for the first time, they asked what do we need. 'We must learn how to make a party. Could you send us some material about that?' They sent us different training material. (…) This apprenticeship, assimilation of experience in this domain, Western practices, it was very rapid, with the help of intuition. (…) For electoral ethics we used methods of the Labor Party from Israel. (…) Among them there are people who speak Russian, who left the USSR twenty or thirty years ago. We have good colleagues who work as party functionaries."⁽⁴¹⁾

What after all remains of different capitals possessed by the communist elite? The ex-nomenklatura benefited from its human (or cultural) capital typical for technical elites of the Soviet type societies - it experienced rapid social mobility produced by the "communist revolution" bringing into power people with technical diploma of high level⁽⁴²⁾. They also have had at their disposal ample political and social capital (social networks derived namely from the Party membership). However, even if the old social capital could be widely mobilized with the aim of reconversion, it could not reproduced itself in identical forms: in short time this capital should recompose (and recomposed) itself in function of new interests, new stakes, movements of the old and new elites.

Such phrase as "modern open capitalism that does not ignore needs of people was my ideal and my career" (the Polish ex-nomenklaturist) clearly proceeds from biographical reconstruction and presents the past and the present as "naturally" related in continuity. These words that are of small credibility if compared to rationality displayed by nomenklatura in 70' when it "with the socialist means was constructing consumer society", nevertheless keep a part of likelihood: the part of nomenklatura, which could be today found in leadership positions of private economy was as much available then for socialism with a grain of "market" as for "social liberalism" so much advocated since 1989. "Biographical reconstruction, carried out taking into account individual interests, never is presented as such and that is why often biased veiled confession helps to come closer to their contradictions and to catch a glimpse of what has been thrown into forgetfulness: hence, none of our interlocutors from ex-nomenklatura (…) did not doubted about his place in the 'dominant class', about privileges associated with it and about shame, which could result from that".⁽⁴³⁾

The members of nomenklatura successfully converted into post-communist elites willingly recognize that first they were liberal and only then they become democratic. Their cynicism translates false ease related in fact to too rapid electoral success and to their incapacity to really assume the past. They do not try to hide; they do not flee inquisitive attention. Their language does not indicate any sort of schizophrenique state; they do not secretly celebrate any forbidden communist rite. On the contrary, in the tensest moments of the decommunisation campaigns they write their Memories and success of these memorialists of auto legitimacy in addition shows that there is real social demand for this past. The former communists feel comfortably and they understand little recurring attacks concerning their past coming from the opponents, they attribute them more to the armory of political competition. Numerous are those who recognize themselves in the residues of the recent political culture. Frequently even among the converted doubts are being expressed what shows that it is difficult to harshly pass from one world into another. Among the ex-communists pass essential cleavages: for or against EU, for or against nationalism, for or against NATO, for or against free market. Pulled out of the same mould, they en frères ennemis confront each other in the battles of tomorrow.

Post-communist elites: from the first towards the second generation

It would be unfair to limit this study by description of the ex-communist conversion. Indeed, a share produced by the nomenklatura elites does not fill the whole space open to the post-communist dominant classes (it even reduces its scope because of a mere demographic factor!). Side by side with the old elites, appear new candidates to the post-communist elite. These elites are born in the democratic opposition (in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, ex- GDR, Bulgaria, the Baltic States, in Poland there additionally are activists from the Solidarnosc trade union) or in some sort of auto-proclaimed opposition to the Communist rule (like in Romania) take over levers of the State and inspire the "desovietization" reforms. Almost everywhere where the democratic opposition was weak and ill adapted to conduct the State they - these new elites - are backed by "apolitical people" (all those who in the period of declining communism succeeded to maintain themselves apart from the Communist Party while still successfully exercising subaltern responsibilities in the bureaucratic hierarchies of decision making). The case of Vaclav Klaus's friends symbolizes this group.

Post-communist researchers in the process of change see succession of two types of elites: elite of rupture and elite of consolidation. According to this conceptualization, elite of rupture (other called it "elite of transition") constitutes the first generation of the Eastern European democratic elites. This elite overthrew communism and installed democracy. "They were visionaries and designers of a new order. They were architects and institution-builders of democracy and the market economy. In most cases they received national recognition a long time before the collapse of Communism. They were prominent dissidents, leaders of social movements, independent intellectuals, party insurgents, rebellious workers, peasants and students. The first generation of democratic elites operated in a unique environment. It was marked by a dominance of symbolic politics and communitarian interests, enthusiastic societal support for reforms, and vast elite autonomy"⁽⁴⁴⁾. In other words, the "revolutionary" merit replaced the cursus honorum typical for the democratic routine political elites who have to accomplish long "accessional" way through different electoral tests.

Now, the second generation of elites (sometimes called "post-transitional elite") came to replace the first generation. Its role is not "to struggle for the new rules of the game, but to employ them in the process of crafting democracy and a market economy, and- subsequently- in peopling the new order. They were elected or nominated to their posts according to the new procedures. They had to face the challenges of more mature democratic politics and market mechanisms: electoral campaigns, class and value conflicts, unemployment, mass social protests, radical re-direction of international politics and trade relations and many others. The charisma of communism fighters was gone, together with people's joy and their unequivocal support for reforms. The new tasks require entirely different skills and even mental make-up. The second generation elite consists of mixture of members of the first generation and newcomers; what is crucial, however, is that they all are acting in a different socio- political environment than the elite of the breakthrough"⁽⁴⁵⁾.

Another angle from which the changing elite situation could be approached is modification of their attitudes, values, stances and their relation with population in general.

Data from the national surveys indicate that the popular trust in democracy and free market diminishes over the years of transition. Society "wakes up" and begins to perceive that neither democracy, nor free market are values per se.

Table No.6 Are you satisfied with development of democracy in Lithuania? (Population)⁽⁴⁶⁾

Table No 7. Are you in favor of free market in Lithuania? (Population)

This deception could be explained by the "elitist" thesis: first, post-communist population in general starts to perceive that procedural democratic rules and free market principles are not necessarily conducive to any "better" social order, and second, in Lithuania some particularly strong elitist tendencies appear and society feels as to be captured and expropriated by abstract liberal principles, instrumentalized by people in power positions.

Table No 8. According to you, the government orients itself towards…⁽⁴⁸⁾

Table No 9. According to you, the Parliament orients itself towards…

The data from the comparative international survey indicate that although all surveyed societies feel bad about reduced scope and lack of transparency of the decision-making process (somehow "captured" by the national elites), the Lithuanian population the most drastically affirms discontent with these elite-centered tendencies. A question for the further research remains, if the Lithuanian society is in reality much stronger expropriated by a "small group" or this impression simply arises from a purely quantitatively distinct situation (in the country of 3.5 million inhabitants a "small group" could numerically be small and named as such but not as "minority")… Anyway, in Lithuania recent development shows growing elite concentration and increasingly non- participatory character of regime.

On the contrary, the data about elites show that elite over time becomes more and more confident about both, free market and democracy. On 5 points scale (5- very much in favor, 1- not in favor at all), elite values attributed to democracy shift from 3.8 to 4.3 and elite values attributed to free market shift from 4.1 to 4.4⁽⁴⁹⁾. Correlation between the support of democracy and the elite's segment as well as place of residence (capital city vs. other places) becomes more pronounced: politicians more outspokenly support democracy than market, people from the capital city (Vilnius) more vigorously express their preferences attributed to the free market.

Thus, the "masses and elites" division over years of the post- communist transition accentuates itself. This observation leads us to study, how other- corollary to the axiological "democracy" and "free market" principles- values evolve.

Table No. 10: Importance of several problems to be solved. Comparative list of elite attitudes in Lithuania 1996-2000
(means: 5 - very important, 1 - very unimportant)

From the list provided we see that all the issues considered gain some attention from the elite (none of issue is evaluated less than 3- "somehow important"). Practically we find the same ranking of the importance of issues over the period of 5 years: the most important problem is the economic growth, and then comes up the taxation reform and increase of fulfillment of business contracts, etc.

Some quite tangible change is observed in elite's perception of the social security system. Its attention to it decreases. To our mind, this phenomenon has deep and important implications. Reasonably low moral economic elite's engagement into the social security system could be firstly explained by the objective arguments. Considering its low level of economic development, Lithuanian has very expanded structures of the social security system. The level of GDP redistribution is comparable to the redistribution level of poorer EU economies and is almost three times higher than in fast growing economies (Asian tigers). The bulk of social burden on earnings is laid on the shoulders of the employer, most often a private employer. This high burden on payments results in escaping into black-market activities, sarcastic views about the social solidarity.

On the other hand, in the actual Lithuanian public discourse, "social security" is associated with income distribution unilaterally directed from richer people towards the poor, with poverty alleviation, pensions, maternity leaves, helping marginal groups. As mentioned above, elite's despise of it illustrates the non- inclusive character of the elite perception of the expected social order, weakness of the community sense with the wide population and growing gap between masses and elites. From other research on elite's attitudes we know that elite is very much supportive of the idea of private pension funds (5% are for complete replacement of the State social security by private pension funds and 31% think that private pension funds could partially replace the State social security agencies in some branches of economy⁽⁵⁰⁾, and expresses great willingness to fully privatize social security system (around 16% are for full State disengagement from the social security finance)⁽⁵¹⁾. The most pro-private social security systems advocates are entrepreneurs. We should interpret this non-inclusive mind of the economic elite (and especially of the entrepreneurs) as their reaction to the typical social behavior in the region that is shaped by egalitarianism and expectations of a generous "welfare state"⁽⁵²⁾ and as their defensive stance vis-à-vis financial burden laid on their shoulders as employers.

As we will see later on, this observation about growing disinterest in social security reform is seconded by growing elite's attention to the situation of the "middle class" (at the expense of decreasing attention to "poverty"). So, we can infer that this value is related not only to the information about social problems (level of poverty, consumption standards, living conditions of the population, social differentiation, etc.) but also with changes in their perception of their own social identity. Elite over the time becomes more and more inclined to identify itself with the "elite" and "(upper) middle class"⁽⁵³⁾.

We see that elite's preoccupations to avoid political dominance from the East and from the West, despite ongoing restructuration of the economic ties and political alliances, do not change much over time. It leads us to think that these elite's orientations and judgments are much strongly related with the deeply ingrained understanding of geo- political and cultural environment, stereotypes about the East and the West than with concrete changing political- economic circumstances as it is constantly underlined by the Lithuanian political forces nursing themselves by the fear "of the Russian sleeping bear".

Table No 11. Do you agree/ disagree with the statements… Comparative list of Lithuanian elite attitudes 1996-2000
(means: 1 - completely disagree, 5 - completely agree)

On all the issues studied we observe quite important changes in elite's (dis) satisfaction or feeling of being concerned. Our first remark is related to evolution of public discourse and transformed semantic field of different categories, appearance of new meanings of the terms and crystallization of their interpretations. Even if there are no exhaustive studies about these issues, differences in elite's and masses' perception and attribution of sense to different terms in Lithuania. However, existing research data permits us to formulate this strong presupposition about disparities and evolution of social representations. For example, "everyone knows that Lithuania is not a rich country, even though the majority of the population considers their standard of living not poor but average. That was the response of 67% of labor force survey respondents, and 72% of the household budget survey. Even 42% of respondents of the benefit recipients survey whose main source of living is social benefits consider themselves as not poor"⁽⁵⁴⁾.

We also see that the pertinence of the political division between the "left" and the "right" in the post-communist societies seems to steadily decrease. On one hand, it is related to the complicated character of the reforms which direction is difficult to easily classify as the "left" or the "right" ("recombinant property"⁽⁵⁵⁾). On the other hand, in Lithuanian it is related to the recent emergence of the forces in political "center". In some of our questionnaires we found even comments about missing questions concerning the "center" (in opposition to questions about the "left" and the "right").

Problems with defining what is "left" and what is "right" are to be traced. The problem here is, firstly, that it is difficult to advocate leftist state intervention in a country where a large part of the national property still belongs to the state. Secondly, a truly liberal program has enjoyed limited support because of the mentioned weakness of the middle class. Thirdly, in a strongly Catholic country, the "merciless" rules of the market have traditionally been opposed in the social teachings of the Church, which favored the "third way" between liberal capitalism and socialism (namely principles of solidarity, social participation, but also paternalism).

Polish researchers claim that in generally the post- communist division between the "left" and the "right" has moved from the sphere of socio- economic options, as is usually the case in Western democracies, to the ideological and axiological sphere⁽⁵⁶⁾. We maintain that the economic elite constitutes a social group, which is little driven by ideological/ axiological motives, but orients itself according to rationally determinable socio- economic indicators. Thus is why their sensitivity to the normative "left" and the "right" decreases over time.

Also, there is a slight decline in elite's anxiety about the ethnic conflicts and military expansion in the region. It is in opposite correlation with the growth of elite's anxiety about the social conflicts. Corruption likewise seems to change its salience in the elite's preoccupations. Growing blame of corruption is not so much related to its objective expansion (on the contrary, it could be said, that extent of corruption shrinks⁽⁵⁷⁾, but to its more articulated legal interpretations.

Notes

1. T. Lowitt, "Y a-t-il des Etats en Europe de l'Est?" (If there are States in the Eastern Europe?), Revue Française de Science Politique, 1979

2. White Stephen (ed.). Political and Economic Encyclopaedia of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Essex, Longmann Current Affairs, 1990, p. 185.

3. Farmer C. Kenneth. The Soviet Administrative Elite, New York, London, Praeger, 1992, p. 80, quoted from Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov. The Communist Party Apparatus, Cleveland, Meridian Books, 1968, p. 211- 212.

4. Pravda Alex (ed.). The Tauris Soviet Directory. The Elite of the USSR today, London, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1989, p. XVI.

5. White, p. 185.

6. Antanaitis Kastytis. Soviet nomenclature of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (1953- 1990). Similarities and differences, Ph D thesis (in Lithuanian), defended in January 2002, in Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania. Quotations from the abstract "Soviet nomenclature of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (1953- 1990). Similarities and differences", p. 18.

7. Ibid, p. 16.

8. Lietuvos rytas, 2002……..

9. The Central Committees of the Communist Parties in the Soviet republics as a rule have had 5 secretaries: the first, the second (in charge of organization and the staff / cadres) and three secretaries in charge of ideological questions, industry and agriculture.

10. Among those who « took care of » the Baltic republics we find names of Suslov, Vyshinski, Dekanozov, Pugo. For the first time Lithuania got rid of the Russian 2^nd secretary only in 1989 when Beriozovas replaced Mitkin (note the caution: Beriozovas is the Russian name, but a person was descendant of a Lithuanian family).

11. Brazauskas Algirdas. Lietuviškos skyrybos (The Lithuanian divorce), Vilnius, Politika, 1992, p . 116.

12. Antanaitis, p. 23- 24.

13. Steen Anton. The New Elites in the Baltic States: Recirculation and Change// Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1997. p. 104.

14. Bagdonavièius Vaclovas, Katinaitë Palmira. "History of Development"// Science and Arts of Lithuania, Vilnius, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, 1997, p. 24- 25 (in Lithuanian and English).

15. Antanaitis, p. 22- 23.

16. Eyal Gil, Szelényi Iván, Townsley Eleanor. Making Capitalism Without Capitalists. The New Ruling Elites in Eastern Europe, London, N.Y., Verso, 2000, p. 28

17. Ibid, p. 28.

18. White, p. 186.

19. P. Mateju, Bl. Rehakova, "Revoluce pro koho? Analyza vybranych vzorcu intergeneracni mobility v obdobi 1989-1992, (For whom the revolution?, analysis of chosen models of the intergenerational mobility in the period 1989-1992), Sociologicky Casospis, n°3, 1993, pp. 309-325

20. I. Szelenyi, D. Treiman, E. Wnuk-Lipinski (dirs.), Elity w Polsce, w Rosji i na Wegrzech. Wymiana czy reproduckcja, (Elites in Poland, Hungary and Russia, Reproduction or change), Polish Academy of Sciences, Warszaw, 1995

21. E. Hanley, P. Mateju, K. Vlachova, J. Krejci (eds.), The making of Postcommunist Elites in Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Working paper.

22. Pravda Alex (ed.). The Tauris Soviet Dictionary. The Elite of the USSR today London, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1989, p. XVII, see also I. Szelenyi et all, op. cit. p. 43

23. Steen Anton.

24. Eyal Gil, p. 122.

25. Ibid, p. 123.

26. I. Szelenyi et all, op. cit. pp. 70-72

27. I. Szelenyi et all. op. cit. p. 44

28. Steen Anton, p. 102.

29. NB: data are from 1993, no comparable data are available for the later period when apparently more non- Lithuanians moved into elite positions in the country.

30. Steen, p. 105.

31. Ibid, p. 105.

32. Ibid, p. 107.

33. Ibid, p. 102.

34. Ibid, p. 103.

35. Krupavicius Algis. Models of Post-communist Political Elites in Central Europe and the Baltics: Comparative Analysis, Hungarian Center for Democracy Studies Foundation, Budapest papers on Democratic transition, No, 158, 1998, p. 13.

36. Lane and Ross, 1995 "The CPSU Ruling Elite 1981- 1991: Commonalities and Divisions"// Communist and Post- Communist Studies, 28: 3, p. 339- 360.

37. Steen, p. 108.

38. Krupavicius. p. 32.

39. G. Mink, J. Ch. Szurek, La Grande Conversion. Le destin des communistes en Europe de l'Est (The Big Conversion. Destiny of communists in the Eastern Europe), Editions du Seuil, 1999.

40. Interview with Adolfas Šleževiius, former member of the CC in Lithuania, Lithuanian prime minister in 1993- 1996, private emtrepreneur, quoted from G. Mink, J. Ch. Szurek, La Grande Conversion. Le destin des communistes en Europe de l'Est (The Big Conversion. Destiny of communists in the Eastern Europe), Editions du Seuil, 1999, p. 94.

41. Interview with Gediminas Kirkilas, quoted from G. Mink, J. Ch. Szurek, La Grande Conversion. Le destin des communistes en Europe de l'Est (The Big Conversion. Destiny of communists in the Eastern Europe), Editions du Seuil, 1999, p. 75- 76.

42. Konrad Gy., Szelenyi I. Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power.

43. G. Mink, J. Ch. Szurek, La Grande Conversion. Le destin des communistes en Europe de l'Est (The Big Conversion. Destiny of communists in the Eastern Europe), Editions du Seuil, 1999, p. 149- 150.

44. . « They were those who suffered the psychological and cultural trauma of extremely rapid and profound change, as well as having to loose their innocence in a painful process of learning overnight the democratic rules of a game that proved much harsher than expected ».Idem, p. 11.

45. Idem, p. 11- 12.

46. Ališauskien Rasa. "Prezidento rinkimai'97: rinkj nuostatos ir ketinimai" (Presidential elections'97: voters' attitudes and intentions), Politologija, Vilnius: Institute of International relations and political science & Polibijaus fondas, 1998, p. 6.

47. Data about year 2000 are taken from the Vilmorus company conducted survey in April, 2000. Data have been published in the daily « Lietuvos rytas », May 12, 2000.

48. Data from the international comparative survey, March- April 2000 (Vilmorus company for Lithuania). Data have been published in the Lithuanian daily « Lietuvos rytas », May 12, 2000.

49. Matonytë Irmina. Posovietinio elito labirintai (Labyrinths of the post-soveit elite), Vilnius, Knygiai, 2001, p. 279.

50. Masiulis Kstutis. Lietuvos elitas. Ekonominës vertybës. Politinës orientacijos. Prognozës (Lithuanian elite. Economic values. Political orientations. Prognosis), Vilnius: Pradai, 1997, p. 54.

51. Masiulis Kstutis. Lietuvos elitas. Ekonominës vertybës. Politinës orientacijos. Prognozës (Lithuanian elite. Economic values. Political orientations. Prognosis), Vilnius: Pradai, 1997, table 13a.

52. Kofman, Roszkowski, "Post-Communist Parties in East- Central Europe" in Holmes Leslie T., Roszkowski W. (Eds.) (1997), Changing Rules. Polish political and economic transformation in comparative perspective, Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997, p. 115- 116.

53. Matonytë Irmina. Posovietinio elito labirintai (Labyrinths of the post-soviet elite), Vilnius, Knygiai, 2001, p. 249- 266.

54. Lazutka Romas "The standard of living and poverty", // State and human development, Vilnius: UNDP, 1998, pp. 62- 63.

55. Stark David (1996), "Recombinant property in east European capitalism", in American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, pp. 993- 1027.

56. Kofman , Roszkowski, "Post-Communist Parties in East- Central Europe" in Holmes Leslie T., Roszkowski W. (Eds.) Changing Rules. Polish political and economic transformation in comparative perspective, Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997, p. 116.

57. Any taxonomy of corruption should include various forms of patronage; forging of documents for personal advantage; bribe taking and bribe giving; extortion; smuggling that involves abuse of office and a host of other forms. One that is particularly relevant to a study of the post- communist countries is where former communists have, while still in positions of authority, used their official positions and insider knowledge to take advantage of the privatization process. This form of corruption should be thoroughly explored (Holmes Leslie T., Roszkowski W. (Eds.) Changing Rules. Polish political and economic transformation in comparative perspective, Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies Polish Academy of Sciences 1997, p. 134).